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Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Curran: Establishing an Implied Private Right of
Action Under the Commodity Exchange Act
In the case of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, the
United States Supreme Court held that there is an implied private right of
action under the Commodity Exchange Act, as amended. As a result of
this holding, a private party may maintain an action for damages caused
by a violation of the Commodity Exchange Act.
In this article, the author examines the Supreme Court's analysis and
explores the future impact of the decision in light of the role the judiciary
has in legislative matters.
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a substantial risk involved when one invests in a fu-
tures trading market,' more commonly known as a commodity
exchange. The potential for price manipulation, as well as fraudu-
lent and deceptive conduct, is readily apparent, and perhaps inev-
itable.2 Consequently, the need for legislative action has
increased with the growth of futures trading in recent years.3
Federal regulation of the Commodity Exchange has attempted to
circumvent the opportunities for fraudulent and deceptive con-
duct. However, Congress has been silent on the issue of a private
right of action for damages resulting from a violation of the Com-
modity Exchange Act (CEA).4
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 5 the
Supreme Court held that the legislative intent of the CEA pro-
vided for an implied private right of action for investors partici-
1. Speculators absorb the substantial risk involved with futures trading. See
generally Department of Treasury and Federal Reserve Bd. Study of Treasury Fu-
tures Markets, reprinted in COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 20,823 (May 14, 1979); see
also H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 132 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974
House Report].
2. Hudson, Customer Protection in the Commodity Futures Market, 58 B.U.L.
REV. 1, 18-35 (1978) (evaluating the effects of various deceptive practices); see also
S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 94, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5843, 5856 [hereinafter cited as 1974 Senate Report].
3. 1974 Senate Report, supia note 2.
4. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825, 1833
(1982).
5. Id.
pating in futures contract trading.6 Congressional silence has not
always been construed as permitting implied rights of action in
the past 7 The approach taken in Curran illustrates the Court's
inclination to look beyond the context of a statute for legislative
intent when important issues are not enunciated in the statutory
scheme. The Curran decision resolves the dilemma of a private
investor who suffers damages under the CEA.8
The purpose of this article is to provide the historical back-
ground leading up to Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Curran, to examine the analysis utilized by the Court, and to
speculate as to what future impact the decision will have.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE IMPLIED RIGHTS DOCTRINE
The implied rights doctrine did not appear in American courts
until 1916.9 However, the significant period of development began
with the case of J.I. Case Co. v. Borak. 10 In Borak, the Court
found an implied right of action under section 14(a) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 and utilized the liberal test of whether
the remedies within the statute were sufficient in light of the leg-
islative purpose. 1 The eleven years following Borak represent a
period of liberal application of the doctrine with several decisions
finding an implied private right of action. 12
In 1975, the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash13 departed from its
previous course of hostility towards implied private rights of ac-
6. Id. at 1844. Trading in futures contracts involves the selling or purchasing
of commodities for a variable price at a future time specified in the futures con-
tract. See Note, The Role of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Under
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, 73 MICH. L. REV. 710, 711
(1975). For a general history of futures trading, see S. REP. No. 850, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3-13, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2093-2101 [hereinafter
cited as 1978 Senate Report].
7. Several 1981 cases failed to find an implied right of action. See Universities
Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981); Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materi-
als, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981); North-
west Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, 451 U.S. 77
(1981); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1 (1981).
8. 102 S. Ct. at 1848.
9. See Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916). Using a "statutory
tort" approach, the court in Rigsby found that private citizens have a right of ac-
tion implied from the language of the Federal Safety Appliance Acts.
10. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
11. Id. at 433.
12. See Note, Implication of Private Actions from Federal Statutes. From
Borak to Ash, 1 J. CORP. L. 371 (1976).
13. 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (holding that no private action for damages against cor-
porate directors should be implied in favor of corporate shareholders under Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act). See also Prentice, Implied Riqhts of Action: Of
Commodities and the Future, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911, 913-14 (1981).
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tion. In Cort, the Supreme Court established a stringent test14 for
determining whether an implied cause of action15 would exist.16
The case of Cannon v. University of Chicago 17 best illustrates this
increasingly conservative approach adopted by the Court to solve
this problem. Although the majority opinion in Cannon found an
implied private right of action, it was the dissenting opinion of
Justice Powell which has had a significant impact on subsequent
decisions. 18 Justice Powell favored an emphasis on searching for
the legislative intent that; was clearly evidenced rather than that
which was only speculated. According to Justice Powell, the Can-
non and Cort decisions "invite independent judicial lawmaking"19
which he did not support.
The impact of Justice Powell's dissent was demonstrated in the
case of Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,20 decided one month af-
ter the Cort decision. In Redington, the Court focused on the im-
portance of legislative intent in the determination of the issue.21
In the same year, the Court in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors,
Inc. v. Lewis 22 specifically quoted from Justice Powell's dissent in
Cannon, reinforcing the emphasis on legislative intent as the
prevalent factor in the determination of whether to imply a pri-
14. See supra note 4, at 1836 n. 51, where four factors in the Cort test were
stated and explained: 1) Is the plaintiff one of the class for whose benefit the stat-
ute was enacted?; 2) Is there any indication of legislative intent?; 3) Is it consistent
with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for
the plaintiff?; and 4) Is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law?
15. See supra note 13, at 913, where the author notes that the more conserva-
tive approach established in Cort was apparently the result of the discomfort of
several members of the court with the rapid pace at which courts seemed to be
implying private causes of action.
16. See Note, A New Direction for Implied Causes of Action, 48 FORDHAM L.
REV. 505, 507 (1980).
17. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
18. After criticizing the analysis suggested in the Cort decision, Justice Pow-
ell stated that "[w] e should not condone the implication of any private right of ac-
tion from a federal statute absent the most compelling evidence that Congress in
fact intended such an action to exist." Id. at 749 (Powell, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 740 (Powell, J., dissenting).
20. 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (Justice Powell did not participate in the decision).
Redington involved the issue of whether customers of a securities brokerage firm
have an implied private right of action under securities laws; See Note, Recent De-
velopments in Commodities Law, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 986, 1001-02 n. 124, 132-33
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Recent Developments ].
21. See Recent Development, supra note 20, at 1001.
22. 444 U.S. 11 (1979). See generally Underwood, TransAmerica Mortgage Ad-
visors, Inc. v. Lewis: An Analysis of the Supreme Court's Definition of an Implied
Right of Action, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 533 (1980).
vate right of action.23 Legislative intent has continued to be the
focus in evaluating implied rights of action cases leading up to
and including Curran. 24
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT
The first legislative action addressing futures trading occurred
in 1921.25 It imposed a prohibitive tax on grain futures transac-
tions. In Hill v. Wallace, 26 the tax was found unconstitutional, but
the regulatory Provisions were reenacted in the Grain Futures
Act.
2 7
In 1936 Congress enacted several amendments 28 to the Grain
Futures Act, including a change in the name to the Commodity
Exchange Act. Additional provisions authorized a commission to
oversee limits on the amount of speculative trading in a futures
contract, and made it a violation to defraud participants in futures
23. 444 U.S. at 15-16. See generally Prentice, supra note 13, at 916-18.
24. 102 S. Ct. at 1841. "A review of the legislative history of the statute persua-
sively indicates that preservation of the remedy was indeed what Congress actu-
ally intended." Id.
25. See The Futures Trading Act, 42 Stat. 187 (1921).
26. 259 U.S. 44 (1922).
27. 42 Stat. 998 (1922).
28. Pub. L. No. 675, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936). The new provision, § 46, 7 U.S.C. § 6(b)
(1976 ed., Supp. III), provides:
It shall be unlawful (1) for any member of a contract market, or for any
correspondent, agent, or employee of any member, in or in connection
with any order to make, or the making of, any contract of sale of any com-
modity in interstate commerce, made, or to be made, on or subject to the
rules of any contract market, for or on behalf of any other person, or (2)
for any person, in or in connection with any order to make, or the making
of, any contract of sale of any commodity for future delivery, made or to
be made, on or subject to the rules of any contract market, for or on behalf
of any other person if such contract for future delivery is or may be used
for (a) hedging any transaction in interstate commerce in such commodity
or the products or by-products thereof, or (b) determining the price basis
of any transaction in interstate commerce in such commodity, or (c) deliv-
ering any such commodity sold, shipped, or received in interstate com-
merce for the fulfillment thereof -
(A) to cheat or defraud or attempt to cheat or defraud such other per-
son;
(B) willfully to make or cause to be made to such other person any false
report or statement thereof, or willfully to enter or cause to be entered for
such person any false record thereof;
(C) willfully to deceive or attempt to deceive such other person by any
means whatsoever in regard to any such order or contract or the disposi-
tion or execution of any such order or contract, or in regard to any act of
agency performed with respect to such order or contract for such person;
or
(D) to bucket such order, or to fill such order by offset against the order
or orders of any other person, or willfully and knowingly and without the
prior consent of such person to become the buyer in respect to any selling
order of such person, or become the seller in respect to any buying order
of such person.
Id.
[Vol. 10: 815, 1983] Commodity Exchange Act
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
trading.29
The CEA was amended once again in 1968.30 The 1936 amend-
ments were clearly insufficient to provide the control and protec-
tion necessary to render the Commodity Exchange effective. The
general purpose of the 1968 amendments was to provide "addi-
tional enforcement authority" 3 1 in an effort to prevent fraudulent
and deceptive activity under the CEA.
In 1974, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act 32 was
enacted by Congress in response to the growth in trading in both
regulated and unregulated commodities. Once again, the purpose
of the Act was "to lessen the potential for abuses in the commod-
ity options markets."33 The 1974 Act implemented
a wide variety of control mechanisms, including the licensing of contract
exchanges and trading personnel, and a full panoply of enforcement pow-
ers, both administrative and judicial, including procedures for the award
of damages in reparations proceedings, arbitration, imposition of civil
fines of up to $100,000 for violations, issuance of cease and desist orders
with fines of up to $100,000 per day for non-compliance, conduct of investi-
gations with power to compel attendance of witnesses and production of
documents, revocation of an exchange's designation, suspension of mem-
bers of exchanges from trading privileges, institution of proceedings in
federal court to compel compliance with orders or to enjoin violations of
the Act, and the assessment of criminal penalties for ... price manipula-
tion, felonies punishable by a fine of not more than $500,000 or imprison-
ment up to five years, or both.3 4
The Futures Trading Act of 197835 is the most recent amend-
ment to the CEA, and provides the states with enforcement
power, authorizing them to bring parens patriae actions seeking
injunctive or monetary relief for injuries to citizens for certain vi-
olations of the CEA.
The actual direction of legislation concerning the CEA was not
29. Id.
30. Pub. L. No. 90-258, 82 Stat. 26 (1968) (amending § 2(a) of the CEA, codified
as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976 ed., Supp. III)).
31. 102 S. Ct. at 1832.
32. Pub. L No. 93-463, 88 Star. 1389 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-23 (1976 ed., Supp.
II). The 1974 amendments established the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion and gave the commission exclusive jurisdiction over futures trading in all
commodities. See 7 U.S.C. § 2, 4(a) (1976 ed., Supp. III).
33. Recent Developments, supra note 20, at 997.
34. Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 328 (2d Cir. 1980) (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
35. Pub. L. No. 95-405, 92 Stat. 865 (1978) (codified at 7 U.S.C. (1976 ed., Supp.
III)); See generally Schneider & Santo, Commodity Futures Trading Commission:
A Review of the 1978 Legislation, 34 Bus. LAW. 1755 (1979); Lower, State Enforce-
ment of the Commodity Exchange Act, 27 EMORY L.J. 1057 (1978).
clear to the courts in the post-1974 era.36 The legislative intent
was clearly focused on a more uniform and comprehensive regu-
latory scheme of futures contract trading, as evidenced by the
1974 amendments. 37 However, the scope of the remedies available
to investors remained undetermined. Subsequent to the enact-
ment of the 1974 amendments, the trend followed by most courts
indicated skepticism towards implied remedies under the CEA.38
This was due in part to the failure of Congress to adopt proposals
which would have specifically provided private remedies to inves-
tors.39 Congress' reluctance to resolve the controversy provided
critics of the implied rights doctrine with substantial support for
their position. 40 The Curran decision illustrates that legislative
intent is to be interpreted from a broad perspective, and not from
specific legislative actions.
In the cases decided before the enactment of the 1974 Act, im-
plied private rights of action were consistently found to exist
under the CEA.41 However, in light of the comprehensive nature
36. Fischer v. Rosenthal & Co., 481 F. Supp. 53, 55 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (emphasiz-
ing post-1974 trend against implying private right of action). Five cases before the
Supreme Court in 1981 denied the implied remedy. See supra note 7. But see
Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283 (2d. Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1346 (1981);
Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980),
cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1971 (1981).
37. See supra note 34.
38. Fein, Receding U.S. Judicial Influence Marked by Rulings in 1980-81 Term,
NAT'L L. J., Aug. 17, 1981, at 23, col. 1.
39. 481 F. Supp. at 56-57. In Fisher, the court examined the legislative history
of the 1974 amendments and concluded that there was no congressional intent to
provide a private cause of action. The opinion emphasized that numerous Senate
bills which would have provided for private recovery were rejected by the Senate
Agricultural and Forestry Committees.
40. See Shipe, Private Litigation Before the Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission, 33 AD. L. REV. 153, 167-168 (1981); Davis, The Commodity Exchange Act:
Statutory Silence is Not Authorization for Judicial Legislation of an Implied Pri-
vate Right of Action, 46 Mo. L. REV. 316, 330-35 (1981); Frankhauser, Private Action
Under the Commodity Exchange Act: Implying Less and Enjoying It More, 35
Bus. LAw. 847 (1980). But see Note, Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., The Continued Validity of an Implied Private Right of Action Under
the Commodity Exchange Act, 22 WM. & MARy L. REV. 579 (1981); Schreiber &
Teweles, Commodities and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission Act of
1974, 10 BEv. HILLS B.J. 16 (1976); Hudson, Customer Protection in the Commodity
Futures Market, 58 B.U.L. REV. 1 (1978).
41. The first case to imply a private right of action under the CEA was Good-
man v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967). In Goodman, the court
found that implied rights of action are not dependant upon the precise language of
the statute and may be implied unless the legislature has shown a contrary intent.
Id. at 447. Similar cases also found implied rights of action prior to the 1974
amendments: Deaktor v. L. D. Schreiber & Co., 479 F.2d 529, 534 (7th Cir. 1973),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. Deaktor, 414 U.S. 113
(1973); Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity Serv., 430 F.2d 132, 133 (8th Cir. 1970); Se-
ligson v. New York Produce Exch., 378 F. Supp. 1076, 1084 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd sub
nom. Miller v. New York Produce Exch., 550 F.2d 762 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 823 (1977); Arnold v. Bache & Co. Inc., 377 F. Supp. 61, 65 (M.D. Pa. 1973);
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of the 1974 Act,42 the role of implied rights of action became in-
creasingly questionable. 43 Congress addressed a wide range of
remedies in the 1974 Act, but remained silent on private rights of
action." As a result of this development, the case of Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran45 became crucial in
resolving the legislative intent issue derived from the CEA, as
amended.
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Supreme Court's opinion in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Curran involved four cases which were decided to-
gether. One of the suits involved an action brought by customers
against a futures commission broker for alleged fraud and decep-
tive conduct.46 The remaining three involved speculators who
brought actions against the mercantile exchange and brokers for
damages resulting from alleged price manipulation, fraud, and
failure to enforce exchange rules. 47
In the first case of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Gould v. Barnes Brokerage Co., 345 F. Supp. 294, 295-96 (N.D. Tex. 1972); Johnson
v. Arthur Espey, Shearson, Harnmill & Co., 341 F. Supp. 764, 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
McCurnin v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 340 F. Supp. 1338, 1342-43 (E.D. La. 1972), affd per
curiam, 477 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1973); United Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l Corp., 311
F. Supp. 1375, 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Anderson v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 291 F.
Supp. 705, 710 (D. Minn. 1968); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 437
(N.D. Cal. 1968) modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970). See also Judge Friendly's
opinion in Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 297 n. 12, where he stated that the
Supreme Court had yet to refuse to request to imply a cause of action under the
securities laws. Both securities and commodities laws have been compared and
contrasted on a regular basis. See generally Goodell, 1978-1979 Securities Law De-
velopments: Implied Private Rights of Action, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 847 (1979).
42. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 6, 7(b), 9, 13(a), 13(a)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. III).
43. Stone v. Saxon & Windsor Group, Ltd., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM.
Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 21,000 at 23,885 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 1980); Fischer v. Rosenthal &
Co., 481 F. Supp. 53, 55 (N.D. Tex. 1979); National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York
Mercantile Exchange, 470 F. Supp. 1256, 1260 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
44. 102 S. Ct. at 1833. The implication of this silence has been argued to be
proof that there is no legislative intent to imply a private cause of action. It has
also been argued, however, that since Congress knew of the case law implying
causes of action, their silence in legislation indicates support of it.
45. Id. at 1825.
46. Id. at 1833.
47. Three of the actions result from "when the sellers of almost 1,000 contracts
failed to deliver approximately 50,000,000 pounds of potatoes, resulting in the larg-
est default in the history of commodities futures trading in this country." Id. (cit-
ing 638 F.2d at 285 (quoting 470 F. Supp. at 1258)).
Curran, 48 respondents were customers of the petitioner, a futures
commission broker. Respondents deposited $100,000 with the pe-
titioner in 1973 for the purpose of trading. As a result of signifi-
cant losses, the account with petitioner was closed.
An action was brought in 1976 in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging violations of
the CEA, the federal securities laws, and state statutory and com-
mon law. Respondents claimed that the petitioner, as their bro-
ker, made material misrepresentations and participated in a
substantial amount of trading for the purpose of generating com-
missions.49 The district court dismissed the federal securities law
claims50 and stayed all other proceedings pending arbitration.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the securities law
claims, but held that the provisions requiring disputes to be set-
tled through arbitration were unenforceable. The conclusion of
the Sixth Circuit was that there was an implied private right of
action under the CEA.51 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve the issue of whether the CEA creates
an implied private right of action for fraud in favor of a customer
against his broker.52
The remaining three cases, New York Mercantile Exchange v.
Leist, Clayton Brokerage Co. of St. Louis, Inc. v. Leist, and
Heinhold Commodities, Inc. v. Leist, were the result of a common
fact situation and were consolidated in the case of Leist v. Sim-
plot. 53 A particular futures contract was traded on the New York
Mercantile Exchange. Under this contract, 50,000,000 pounds of
Maine potatoes were to be delivered between May 7, 1976, and
May 25, 1976 by railroad. The contract had a trading period begin-
ning in the early part of 1975 and ending on May 7, 1976. During
48. 622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 451 U.S. 906 (1981).
49. Id. at 220. These allegations would constitute violations of the CEA if
found to be true.
50. Id. at 221-24.
51. Judge Engel wrote the opinion and stated:
Although the CEA does not expressly provide for a private right of ac-
tion to recover damages, an implied right of action was generally thought
to exist prior to the 1974 amendment of the Act. Consistent with this view,
no issue concerning the continuing validity of the implied right of action
was raised in the court below, nor in this appeal. Nevertheless, to provide
direction to the district court upon remand and to avoid further delay in
this already protracted litigation, we review this issue and specifically
agree that an implied private right of action survived the 1974 amend-
ments to the Act.
Id. at 230 (footnotes omitted).
52. 451 U.S. 906 (1981).
53. 638 F.2d 283 (2nd Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 450 U.S. 910 (1981). The New
York Mercantile Exchange, Clayton Brokerage of St. Louis, Inc., and Heinhold
Commodities, Inc. were listed as appellees in Leist and are the named petitioners
in Curran.
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this trading period, the Department of Agriculture issued reports
indicating that Maine potato stocks were substantially down from
the preceding year. The impact of these reports resulted in in-
creasing the number of investors trading for May Maine potato fu-
tures contracts with the objective of making profit from a shortage
of potatoes in May.5 4
A conspiracy of large processors of potatoes was formed to
lower the price of the May Maine potato futures contract. To
achieve this objective, the conspirators developed a large short
position5 5 in the May contract, and did not make offsetting
purchases of long contracts at a price in excess of a certain
amount. A short position. exists where an investor has a contract
to sell in the future at a given price; a long position exists where
an investor has physical possession of a commodity of a contract
to buy in the future at a given price. They also agreed to default
on short commitments if necessary. These conspirators also
flooded the Maine cash markets with unsold potatoes.5 6 The pur-
pose of these activities was to give the Growers Association rea-
son to believe that there would not be a shortage of Maine
potatoes.
Another group was aware of the short conspiracy and, in an at-
tempt to counteract as well as to enhance the price short conspir-
ators would have to pay to liquidate their short positions, they
developed a large long position which violated trading limits of
the CEA.57 These long conspirators also created an artificial
shortage of railroad cars during the contract delivery period.58
The respondents in all three actions were speculators who in-
vested long in Maine potato futures contracts. These speculators
claimed that absent the price manipulation, they would have real-
ized a substantial profit. The petitioners in the case of New York
Mercantile Exchange v. Leist were the New York Mercantile Ex-
change and its officials. Respondents alleged that the Exchange
54. 102 S. Ct. at 1834-35.
55. "The tendency is for a speculator to take a position, test the waters for a
definite price trend and withdraw quickly if a favorable price trend does not de-
velop." Hudson, supra note 40, at 6.
56. The complaint alleged that all of these activities violated §§ 4(b) and 9(b)
of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 6(b), 13(b) (1976 ed., Supp. III); § 4(a), 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) and
§§ 5(d) and 5(a)(8), 7 U.S.C. §§ 7(d), 7(a)(8).
57. 102 S. Ct. at 1835. The purpose of trading limits is to limit and prevent
large scale fraudulent and deceptive activity.
58. 102 S. Ct. at 1835 n. 45.
had failed to exercise its power and duty to prevent such price
manipulation resulting in a lack of enforcement of CEA rules.5 9
Petitioners in the case of Clayton Brokerage Co. of St. Louis, Inc.
v. Leist and Heinhold Commodities, Inc. v. Leist were the firms of
futures commission brokers which the short conspirators utilized
to achieve their short position. Respondents alleged that these
brokers and their firms were part of the conspiracy and, as a re-
sult, violated position and trading limits under the CEA which re-
quires liquidation of contracts that clearly are impossible to fulfill.
In addition, petitioners did not report any violations of CEA rules
to the Commission, thus allegedly violating their statutory duty.
These three actions were filed in 1976 in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York. The court held that
Congress did not intend a private right of action in the CEA.60
Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment on all three ac-
tions. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit re-
versed, finding that there was legislative intent implying a private
right of action.61 The Second Circuit based its decision on "the
1974 Congress' awareness of the uniform judicial recognition of
private rights of action under the Commodity Exchange Act and
[its] desire to preserve them." 62
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
all four actions which revolved around the issue of implied pri-
vate rights of action.63 Justice Stevens wrote the opinion and
held:
(1) there is an implied private right of action under the Commodity Ex-
change Act, even following the 1974 amendment; (2) plaintiffs had stand-
ing to assert claims for fraudulent and deceptive practices and price
manipulation; (3) characterization of plaintiffs as "speculators" does not
remove them from the class intended to be protected by the Act; (4) ac-
tion could be maintained against the exchange; and (5) persons who are
participants in a conspiracy to manipulate the market in violation of an
exchange's rules are subject to suit by futures traders who can prove in-
jury from those violations.64
59. Id. at 1835.
60. National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Merchantile Exch., 470 F. Supp.
1257, 1259-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Relying on the Cort test, the court concluded "that
there is no private right of action under the Act because the two critical elements
of the test, congressional intent and consistency with the statutory scheme, weigh
strongly against the implication of such a right." Id. at 1261.
61. 638 F.2d'283-322 (2d Cir. 1980). The court of appeals also utilized the four
factor Cort test but reached the conclusion that a private right of action was im-
plied. Id. at 322.
62. Id. at 307.
63. 450 U.S. 910 (1981).
64. 102 S. Ct. at 1825.
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V. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
A. Legislative Intent in Light of a Recognized Remedy
In Curran, the Court held that there is an implied private right
of action under the CEA, as evidenced by legislative intent. The
rationale for the Court's decision was supplied by two factors.
First, prior to the 1974 amendment, private rights of action were
routinely implied providing for a recognized remedy.65 Second,
the 1974 amendment did not substantially alter the CEA as previ-
ously interpreted. 66 Thus, it is the logical inference that had Con-
gress intended to prevent this implied remedy, specific language
would have been incorporated into an amendment to alter what
had been common practice in the past. Absent any such language
in either the 1974 or 1978 amendment, 67 the Court decided that
Congress, by implication, lent its support to the remedy of an im-
plied private right of action.68
The 1974 amendment provided for various judicial remedies, 69
but was silent on the issue of a private right of action. Although
prior to 1974 the courts had resolved this issue in favor of finding
such a remedy,70 the enactment of the 1974 amendment and its
comprehensive nature re-opened the controversy.7 ' A primary
concern of the Court in Curran was the state of the law in 1974.
The Court stated that "[i]n determining whether a private cause
of action is implicit in a federal statutory scheme when the stat-
ute by its terms is silent on that issue, the initial focus must be on
the state of the law at the time the legislation was enacted."72
The state of the law immediately prior to the enactment of the
1974 amendment is demonstrated by a number of district court
decisions which consistently found implied private rights of
65. See supra note 41.
66. "[T]he fact that a comprehensive reexamination and significant amend-
ment of the CEA left intact the statutory provisions under which the federal
courts had implied a cause of action is itself evidence that Congress affirmatively
intended to preserve that remedy." 102 S. Ct. at 1841.
67. The Supreme Court took the approach that silence is the equivalent to
acquiescence.
68. 102 S. Ct. at 1841-44.
69. See supra note 28.
70. See supra note 41.
71. See, e.g., National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exch., 470 F.
Supp. 1256, 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp. 105, 107-08 (N.D. Ill.
1979); Hofmayer v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc., 459 F. Supp. 733, 737 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
72. 102 S. Ct. at 1839.
action.73
Congress was aware that the courts were routinely implying
private rights of action prior to 1974.74 As stated in Cannon, "[ilt
is always appropriate to assume that our elected representatives,
like other citizens, know the law."7 5 The significance of the state
of the law in 1974 is increased by the fact that it is "difficult to
characterize anything in the legislative history of the 1974 amend-
ments as constituting congressional approval of the implied ac-
tion cases under the CEA."76 In addition, the Court emphasized
that the 1974 amendment was enacted "to supplement rather than
supplant the implied judicial remedy."77
The inclusion of a savings clause in section 2(a) (1) of the 1974
amendment was of significance to the Court in its evaluation. The
savings clause provides that "[niothing in this section shall
supercede or limit the jurisdiction conferred on courts of the
United States or of any State."78 The Court interpreted this
clause as direct evidence of legislative intent authorizing implied
private rights of action.7 9 Although the 1974 amendment did not
expressly mention private rights of action, the Court held that
congressional intent supports such a remedy. As expressed by a
recent Supreme Court decision, "[tihe key to the inquiry is the
intent of the Legislature." 80
B. Characterization as Speculators
The Court in Curran held that even speculators may maintain
an action for damages under the CEA. The Court stated that
"[t]he statutory scheme could not effectively protect the produ-
cers and processors who engage in hedging transactions without
also protecting the other participants in the market whose trans-
actions over exchanges necessarily must conform to the same
trading rules."81 Specifically, the antifraud provisions of the CEA
- making it unlawful for any person to deceive or defraud any
other person in connection with any futures contract - are direct
73. See supra note 41.
74. See Rivers v. Rosenthal & Co., 634 F.2d 774, 779 (1980), where the court
cited numerous cases holding that a private cause of action was available under
the CEA prior to 1974.
75. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 696-97.
76. Prentice, supra note 13, at 933.
77. 102 S. Ct. at 1842.
78. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976 ed., Supp. III).
79. 102 S. Ct. at 1843.
80. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1, 13 (1981); see also Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S.
630, 639 (1981).
81. 102 S. Ct. at 1844.
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evidence that all persons are protected under the CEA.82 The leg-
islative history of federal regulation of futures contract trading
clearly indicates the intention of Congress to protect all persons
involved. It has been stated that "[ilt is almost self-evident that
legislation regulating future trading was for the 'especial benefit'
of futures traders,"8 3 which includes speculators.
C. Liability of Exchanges
Suits by investors against exchanges were well recognized prior
to the enactment of the 1974 amendments. The issue of the liabil-
ity of exchanges to private investors was of some concern to the
legislature, as evidenced in hearings, preceding the 1974 amend-
ments. 84 As a consequence of the self regulatory nature of the
CEA, the threat of private actions against the Commodity Ex-
change became a substantial concern.85 The result of this devel-
opment was to make the Commodity Exchange cautious in rule-
making since it potentially increased its liability. 86
Congress could have avoided this problem by explictly elimi-
nating private causes of action.87 Congress, however, resolved the
problem by allowing the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion to supplement exchange rules. 88 The result of this action
82. See supra note 28. See also 102 S. Ct. at 1844-45.
83. 638 F.2d at 306-07. For a general discussion of investor protection see Hud-
son, supra note 40.
84. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 11955 before the House Committee on Agricul-
ture, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., 62 (1974); Hearings on Review of Commodity Exchange
Act and Discussion of Possible Changes before the House Committee on Agricul-
ture, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 121 (1973).
85. Some observers believe that the provision of the 1968 amendments re-
quiring exchanges to enforce their own rules, thereby implicitly giving pri-
vate parties the right to sue for nonenforcement, has had a perverse effect.
To avoid the risk of litigation, exchange authorities have been encouraged
to reduce rather than strengthen rules designed to insure fair trading.
120 CONG. REC. 10,748 (1974). See also 119 CONG. REC. 41,333 (1973).
86. 119 CONG. REc. 41,333 (1973):
Attorneys for exchanges are now advising their clients to prune out rules
or regulations where the enforcement capability is questionable. Instead
of a situation where self-regulatory activities should be expanding for a
given contract market, the exchange can now provide solid reason for
shrinking the protection given the customer and the public through self-
regulation.
Id.
87. See, e.g., Hearings on Review of Commodity Exchanges Act and Discussion
of Possible Changes before the House Committee on Agriculture, 93rd Cong., 1st
Sess., 121 (1973).
88. See § 8(a)(7) of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 12(a)(7) (1976 ed., Supp. III).
preserved the implied private right of action, and provided a solu-
tion to excessive litigation against exchanges. There appears to
be substantial evidence of congressional intent authorizing an im-
plied private right of action. If Congress intended otherwise, it
should have said so.
Private rights of action against exchanges serve as an enforce-
ment mechanism and reflect the legislative purpose of strength-
ening the regulatory scheme of the CEA.89
VI. DISSENTING OPINIONS
Justice Powell dissentedo in Curran because he held a differ-
ent view of the law prior to the 1974 amendments, he thought the
majority's analysis was weak, and he felt that Congress should
adopt legislation creating a private right of action.
With regard to the state of the law prior to 1974, Justice Powell
emphasized that fewer than a dozen district courts had created a
remedy under the CEA 91 and, in his opinion, these decisions were
in error. He stressed that even though this error had not been
corrected by Congress, the Court need not be bound by it.92
Justice Powell also noted that the majority relied on certain
1974 additions to the CEA demonstrating evidence of weak analy-
sis. The first addition of significance was section 8a(7) of the Act,
which "authorized the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
to supplement the trading regulations established by individual
commodity exchanges." 93 Justice Powell suggested that this leg-
islative enactment neither approved nor disapproved of an im-
plied remedy.94
The second type of statutory addition allegedly relied upon in
error by the Court involved "two sections creating procedures for
89. "Congress wished to preserve the private cause of action as a tool for en-
forcement of the self-regulation concept of the CEA." 102 S. Ct. at 1847. The Court
also concluded that if exchanges can be held liable for failure to enforce their own
rules, price manipulators in the market are also subject to liability. See, e.g., Deak-
tor v. L. D. Schreiber & Co., 479 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.), rev'd on other ground sub nom.
Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. Deaktor, 414 U.S. 113 (1973).
90. 102 S. Ct. at 1848. Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor joined in the dissent.
91. See id. at 1850.
92. Justice Powell argued that several cases erroneously followed the case of
Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967), since Goodman did
not address the crucial issue of whether Congress intended to create a private
remedy under the CEA. Id.
93. 102 S. Ct. at 1852.
94. Id. The majority opinion argued that the enactment of this section was
clear legislative intent to preserve the implied remedy established by the courts.
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reimbursing victims of CEA violations."95 The dissent interjected
that this section does not demonstrate the general intent to pro-
vide additional relief to private parties, claiming that the majority
ignored "settled rules for identification of congressional intent."96
The addition of the "savings clause" in the 1974 amendments
was a significant aspect of the majority opinion, and was of con-
cern to the dissenting justices. This section provides jurisdiction
to federal courts for judicially cognizable claims.97 Justice Powell
argued that this section evidenced no support for private reme-
dies. The Court was expanding the meaning of the savings clause
beyond its bounds.98
Perhaps the most appealing argument made by the dissenting
Justices was that proposals for including a private remedy in the
CEA were not adopted by Congress.99 The argument was best
summarized by Justice Powell: "There simply is no persuasive
evidence of affirmative Congressional intent to recognize rights
through the enactment of statutory law, even under the Court's
unprecedented theory of congressional ratification by silence of
judicial error."1 00
VII. AuTHOR's ANALYSIS
The result in Curran was not an expected one.101 With regard
to the growing trend of stringent interpretation of the implied
95. 102 S. Ct. at 1853. Justice Powell claimed that this "statutory change cited
by the Court actually undercuts rather than supports its case." Id.
96. Id. "[It is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a stat-
ute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of
reading others into it." Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11,
19 (1979).
97. See supra note 79.
98. 102 S. Ct. at 1853-54. Justice Powell's argument is overwhelmingly logical.
The "savings clause" does not indicate any legislative intent towards implying a
private remedy. However, the Court claims that it indirectly supports the implied
remedy. This analysis is weak at best.
99. See supra note 39. But see Navigator Group Funds v. Shearson Hayden
Stone, 487 F. Supp. 416, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The court stated that it is not "useful
to speculate on the significance of bills which were never debated on the floor of
Congress or made the subject of committee reports." Id. See generally Hearings
on S. 2485, S. 2578, and S. 2837, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 737 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
1974 Hearings 1.
100. 102 S. Ct. at 1854.
101. Shipe, supra note 40, at 167-68. "Hence, unless Congress takes further ac-
tion on the matter, the probability is that the Supreme Court will find that court
private rights of action are no longer available." Id.
rights doctrine, 102 it was logical to assume that the Supreme
Court would require a clear showing of congressional intent as a
prerequisite for implying a private remedy. Contrary to this
logic, the Supreme Court focused on the fact that no affirmative
action was taken by Congress to eliminate the implied remedy
which had been established by the courts. 0 3 This analysis did
not indicate a clear intent of any kind.104 The argument that con-
gressional silence established congressional intent to imply a pri-
vate right of action demonstrates a lack of analysis by the Court.
The decision exemplifies the objective of the Court to give content
to congressional silence to protect investors in the futures
market. 0 5
Congress' failure to enact legislation which would have pro-
vided for a private right of action under the CEA evidences a leg-
islative intent much clearer than that recognized by the Court. 0 6
However, the majority did not mention this fact. 0 7 In 1973, bills
were introduced in both the House and Senate providing for a pri-
vate action under the CEA.108 They were rejected, however, by
Congress. In particular, Representative Neal Smith introduced a
bill which provided in part as follows: "Any person violating any
provision of this Act or any regulation thereunder shall be liable
to any person injured thereby for treble the amount of the dam-
ages sustained as a result of such violation."109 There can be little
102. Implied private remedies were denied in the post-1974 period in the follow-
ing cases: Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Conaway, 515 F. Supp. 202
(N.D. Ala. 1981); Walsh v. International Precious Metals Corp., 510 F. Supp. 867 (D.
Utah 1981); Gonzalez v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 499
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Mullis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 492 F. Supp.
1345 (D. Nev. 1980); Stone v. Saxon & Windsor Group, Ltd., 485 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D.
Ill. 1980); Fischer v. Rosenthal & Co., 481 F. Supp. 53 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Liang v.
Hunt, 477 F. Supp. 891 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Berman v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields,
Inc., 467 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
103. See supra note 41.
104. The Court interpreted legislative intent by negative implication. It is
doubtful, in the author's opinion, that Congress would encourage courts to inter-
pret legislative silence in this manner.
105. Perhaps the Court viewed congressional silence as an "open door" to the
judiciary to fill in any gaps that it deemed necessary.
106. See supra note 99.
107. Id. It is important to note, however, that each of the bills provided for
treble damages which could have been the reason for their defeat.
108. In the Senate, bills were introduced by Senators Hart, Humphrey and Mc-
Govern. Hearings on S. 2837, S. 2485, S. 2378 before the Senate Committee on Agri-
culture and Forestry, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 77, 118 (1973). In the House,
Representative Neal Smith introduced H.R. 11195. Hearings on H.R. 11195 before
the House Committee on Agriculture, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., (1973) [hereinafter cited
as House Report].
109. See House Report, supra note 108. See also Fischer v. Rosenthal & Co., 481
F. Supp. 53, 56-57 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
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doubt that the deliberate refusal to adopt proposals such as that
of Representative Smith demonstrates congressional intent.
There is a policy argument in favor of the Court's decision in
Curran. The general purpose of the 1974 amendments to broaden
the scope of remedies and provide comprehensive regulations for
the CEA is clearly in harmony with the Court's decision. 110 The
Curran Court apparently interpreted congressional silence in
favor of the general purposes of the 1974 amendment. Arguably,
the extension of these purposes to create a private remedy is fair
and just for all. It would seem, however, that the fairness pro-
vided by Curran lies at the expense of legislative influence."'
Although the approach of the Curran Court indicates an active
future for the judiciary in legislative matters, it may provide the
appropriate balance between "legislative lobbying" and "judicial
justice."
VIII. IMPACT OF THE DECISION
The Supreme Court's decision in Curran is a significant indica-
tion of future interaction between the judicial and legislative
branch. While the inclination of the Court to look beyond the
context of a statute has not always been clear,112 the Curran deci-
sion imparts unequivocal evidence that the Supreme Court will
undertake such action in resolving issues of importance.
The Court has demonstrated that violations of the exchange
rules will result in litigation by private investors suffering dam-
ages. The Court recognized the importance of protecting all par-
ticipants in futures trading." 3 Curran is part of the continuing
trend towards comprehensive regulation of futures contract trad-
ing as a result of the inherent risks involved." 4 This decision will
influence future legislation concerning private investors' rights
and will progressively reduce the unnecessary risks commonly as-
sociated with futures contract trading."15
110. See generally, Hudson, supra note 40.
111. 'The Court propounds a test that taxes the legislative branch with a duty
to respond to opinions of the lower federal courts." 102 S. Ct. at 1855 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
112. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (Court acted in deferrence
to congressional discretion on issues of military nature and was hesitant to give in
depth analysis).
113. See supra note 83.
114. 102 S. Ct. at 1841.
115. It is doubtful, if not impossible, to eliminate all risks in trading of such a
The decision will further the protection-oriented purpose of the
CEA.116 In particular, the opinion may deter fraudulent and de-
ceptive conduct in futures contract trading.1 7 As a result of the
potential liability now firmly established, exchanges and brokers
will conduct their business in a more cautious manner. Ex-
changes will be inclined to enforce their rules more effectively
and brokers will be wary of activity which is against the best in-
terests of their clients.118 This result is not only in the best inter-
ests of the investors; it will strengthen the reputation of futures
trading in general, benefiting all participants. I 19
In a broader sense, the Curran decision contributes to the foun-
dation for an increasingly active role of the judiciary in the legis-
lative arena.120 Congressional silence will no longer be a barrier
to judicial activity. The Supreme Court has undertaken the re-
sponsibility of interpreting legislative intent and will probably
continue to build upon this responsibility in the future.
IX. CONCLUSION
Although Curran established an implied private right of action
under the CEA, the decision is not supported by the legislative
history.'21 The failure to adopt bills expressly providing for a pri-
vate remedy unquestionably demonstrates legislative intent con-
trary to the result in Curran. In furtherance of the trend of
comprehensive regulation of futures contract trading, the Court
found an implied private right of action. Even though the deci-
sion may not be logically consistent, it provides a remedy for
private investors who would otherwise be at a severe disad-
vantage. 22
Curran represents the increasing interaction between the judi-
cial and legislative branches. 23 The Court appears to look be-
yond the context of the CEA and focus on what should have been
nature, however, the importance of reducing the unnecessary risks of fraudulent
and deceptive activity is clearly recognized.
116. See supra note 110.
117. See generally 1974 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 18, recognizing that fu-
tures trading is susceptible to fraudulent and deceptive activity.
118. A typical abuse by brokers is to generate substantial trading with a client's
account for the purpose of generating commissions. This occurred in Curran. See
102 S. Ct. at 1834.
119. It is logical to assume that reducing the risks involved with futures trading
will inspire more persons to participate, which in turn, generates more business
for brokers.
120. See supra note 112.
121. See supra note 108.
122. Although the 1974 and 1978 amendments provide for various remedies,
they remained silent on the issue of a private right of action.
123. See supra note 120.
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the legislative intent.124 This is a significant step in the Court's
role in legislative matters. In light of the inevitable failure of Con-
gress to anticipate each and every potential controversy, perhaps
this "active role" of the Court is needed. The judicial interpreta-
tion of legislative intent should be exercised cautiously, however,
in order to preserve the effectiveness of congressional action upon
which the Court may not be adequately informed.
HOWARD E. HAMANN
124. The Curran Court bases its decision on
Court, rather than legislative intent.
the ultimate purposes of the

